Introduction
Multicast transmissions have widespread use for information and content distribution (e.g., audio and video).
They are efficient as they minimize the number of messages traversing a single link by creating a multicast tree. A multicast transmission incurs a cost and it is justifiable that the users who receive the transmission pay for it. Most applications such as audio and video multicast transmissions involve a content provider who charges money from the receivers for providing the content However the amount a user is willing to pay is determined. by the benefit it receives from the transmission.
The benefit for each user e is quantified by a private sin gle valued parameter u, known as the user's utility. User e will like to receive the transmission if her cost share x, is less than her utility, i. e., if her welfare We = u x -x, is positive. Cost Algorithmic Mechanism Design (AMD) [12] and Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design (DAMD) [7] study mechanisms in which the outcome and the payment depend on the input provided by the participants. These participants (called agents) are assumed to be rational (i.e., they want to maximize their profit). They have strong motivation to lie about their private values in order to get extra benefit. The task of the system designer is to design mechanisms that achieve system-wide goals. These goals may be hampered if the agents lie about their private values. To prevent manipulation and motivate users to participate honestly, Mechanism Design theory (a subfield. of Microeconomics) is used to model the behavior of agents. Of importance are the strategyproofmechanisms [9] , in which the users obtain maximum profit when they declare their private values truthfully. In standard AMD [12] , a centralized trusted entity implements the mechanism, i.e., collects the input from agents, calculates the outcome and distributes the payment. When the mechanism is implemented in a distributed system [6] , the agents themselves execute the algorithm and collectively calculate the outcome and the payments. Distributed implementations of mechanisms have been proposed, for various problems such as multicast cost sharing [6] and, scheduling [3] . [10] proposed a MC mechanism assuming the ANM. They augmented the original MC mechanism for the TPM proposed, in 16] with asymmetric key cryptographic primitives to prevent cheating. Specifically they used digital signatures to authenticate the sender of the messages and use auditing to verify that the agents executed, the protocol correctly.
The MC mechanism is strategyproof and efficient (maximizes the overall welfare), but not budget balanced.. In fact it is known that it generally runs budget deficit and in many cases does not generate any revenue at all [ILL] . No strategyproof mechanism can be both efficient and budget balanced, at the same time 8]. The MC mechanism is recommended when the multicast delivery may be subsidized, if the mechanism runs a budget deficit [71. Since the MC mechanism does not generate sufficient revenue, it is not a suitable mechanism from the content provider's point of view. The content provider will quickly go out of business, especially when there exists competing content providers.
Also the MC mechanism is susceptible to collusion [41.
The SH mechanism is a better choice from these considerations because it is budget balanced and group strategyproof. The SH mechanism possesses Consumer Sovereignty (CS), in addition to No-Positive Transfers (NPT) and Voluntary Participation (VP) properties. The MC mechanism satisfies NPT and VP, but does not satisfy CS 11 1] . Although the SH mechanism is not efficient, for large user populations it approaches perfect efficiency. Also from the class of group-strategyproof mechanisms which are budget-balanced, the SH mechanism minimizes the worst-case welfare loss [1 1] . The only drawback of the SH mechanism is that it has a higher network complexity [5] . However, we believe that the cost-share calculation will induce a relatively small overhead to the overall multicast transmission. Thus it is justifiable to prefer the SH mechanism, given its excellent properties.
In this paper our objective is to develop distributed protocols that implement the however, in our protocols we allow more than one user per node. Since the SIH[ mechanism involves more than one iteration of bottom-up and, top-down traversals (unlike the MC mechanism which has only one iteration), we propose methods to prevent deviations in any iteration.
Shneidman et aL [14] proposed the concept of faithful implementation of a mechanism. When the distributed mechanisms are implemented, by the agents themselves, they may deviate from the specified algorithm if it is beneficial to do so. These deviations are categorized in three groups, information revelation, message passing and computation. A faithful implementation is a specification of a mechanism where the agents cannot gain any benefit by deviating from it. We show that our proposed, distributed. protocols are faithful implementations of the SH mechanism.
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we present the background including the network model and the SHI-mechanism for TPM. Section 3 begins with the description of how nodes can cheat in the original implementation of the SH mechanism for TPM. We then present our proposed protocols implementing the SH mechanism for ANM. In section 4 we show that our protocols are faithful implementations ofthe SH mechanism. We also implemented, our proposed mechanisms and, deployed them on PlanetLab. In section 5 we describe the experimental setup and the results we obtained from the experiments. Section 6 concludes the paper with a summary and future research directions.
Background

Model
We assume the following network model. The user population P resides at N nodes. Each user e P resides at some node i C V. The nodes are connected by bidirectional linlks. R C P is the set of users who receive the multicast transmission. The transmission starts from a node root C N and flows through a static multicast tree T(R) C T(P), where T(R) and T(P) denote the multicast tree connecting the nodes in R and, P respectively. The techniques used to create these trees are described in [6, 15] . We denote the subtree rooted at node i as Ti. Each link connecting node i to its parent node p has a cost c? associated with it C, denotes the set of all the t children kl kt of node i and ri denotes the set of all the users at node i.
Shapley Value Mechanism for the Tamper-Proof Model
The Shapley Value [13] mechanism is implemented using an iterative algorithm. In the bottom-up traversal each node i determines the number of users ai in Ti who choose to receive the transmission. i? is the cost share of each of the resident users at node i who receive the transmission, i.e. e = 3i,Ve C ri n R. ni represents the number of users at node i' who choose to receive the transmission. The bottom-up traversal starts from the leaf nodes. A leaf node k reports its Cvk value to its parent (for the leaf nodes, ak = nk). Nodes (other than leaf nodes) calculate ai = EkCCI. a+ ni and send it to their parent node. After root receives ai, i i Croot, it initiates the top-down traversal, where it sends 3root = 0 to each of its children. Each node receives dp from its parent and computes 3i as follows: @3 (Ci + (1) 3i is then sent to all the children of node i (i. e., all nodes k Ci). All users e i ri are assigned the cost share Se 3j. If the cost share xe of any user e is greater than its utility u, then user e declines to receive the transmission.
In that case ai decreases and it needs to be updated in the next bottom-up traversal. This increases the cost shares of the other users sharing the links with e. Thus in each iteration of the bottom-up and the top-down traversal, users may be removed from the receiver set R and the cost shares are updated. These iterations are repeated until no more users are dropped and until the cost share of any user does not change in two subsequent iterations. Initially R = P and in the worst case one user is dropped, in each iteration. If we assume that the algorithm converges in m iterations, the number of messages required in this case is Q(n x m).
The detailed analysis of computational and communication complexity is presented in [6] . An example of the execution of one iteration of the SH mechanism is shown in Figure 1 .
Shapley Value Mechanism for Autonomous Nodes Model
The distributed implementation of the SH mechanism in [6] , is vulnerable to deviations by the nodes. In this section we present our proposed protocols that implement the SH mechanism and, prevent such deviations. We first present the notation used. in describing the proposed protocols. Then we describe the ways in which a node can cheat in the original protocol. Finally we describe our proposed protocols.
Notat'ion
As described in section 2 2 SH is an iterative mecha nism. It performs more than one iteration of the bottom-up and, top-down traversals. The number of users at node i, in iteration j who choose to receive the multicast transmission is denoted by ni/. For iteration jthe number of users in the subtree rooted at i which receive the transmission is a&
The cost share of users at node i, calculated in iteration j is denoted by /. During the top-down phase of iteration , node i receives cost share p from p. The cost share 3' is calculated using the formula = (c? / ) + 3p (from (1)) The message MI signed by node i using its private key K is denoted by EK/ [Ml -
Cheating in the Tamper-Proof Model
In the following we show how a node can cheat by manipulating the values sent to other nodes. The scenario in which no cheating occurs is shown in Figure 1 . For simplicity we assume that every node has only one user. The values of ao and 3/ are shown for iteration j. In Figure 1 , the user at node 3 has to pay 4 and users at node 4 and, 5, each pays 6.
By modifying 3' sent to its children, node i ensures that the users at node i receive the transmission but pay nothing. To maintain the budget balance, node i makes its children (and all the nodes in its subtree) pay an extra amount, to compensate for the cost of transmission received by the users at node i. Node i sends 3/ to its children instead of 13. 1 is calculated using the formula 13/ = (ci +@J j n)/(aj-Tj) + @p. Essentially node i divides the cost of link ci among the users in its subtree, excluding users residing at i. The users at node i have also to share the costs of links from p to root, which is 13. Node i distributes the share of its users to its descendants by adding 33Jn/to ci and divid.ing only by the nu.mber of descendants (a -nj). Thus node i assigns zero as the cost share to its resident users. The cost share 3j is calculated in such a way that the budget remains balanced and the root cannot detect the cheating. Figure 2 shows how node 3 cheats. The user residing at node 3 pays nothing and the users at node 4 and 5 each pays 8. Thus each of them pays an extra amount of2. The total amount overpaid collectively by the two users at node 4 and 5 is 4, compensating for the payment of the user at node 3.
In addition to the cheating described in Figure 2 , there are other ways in which a node can cheat. One way is that node i can increase the value of a/ sent in the bottom-up phase. Thus the cost of the links connecting ito root will be shared among a greater number of users, thus reducinog the per-user share at nodes in the tree T(P) -Ti ( 
SH-ANM Protocol
The following notation and, primitives will he used in the protocol description: m denotes the final iteration in which the mechanism stabilizes, is the concatenation operator; send(M, R) denotes sending message MI to a node R; reev(M, R) denotes receiving message V1 from a node R; and verify(proof ) represents the procedure used to verify the proof received from nod,e i'.
The proposed protocol is presented in Figure 3 The pro tocol is executed in three phases. Both protocols, SH-ANM and SH-ANM-E, prevent node deviations, however they differ in their detection capabilities and resource requirements. In SR-ANM, the nodes are audited in Phase 3 with probability Probp, so there is a chance that a cheating node may remain undetected. In SH-ANM-E, node i verifies the computation of LP3 by parent p and so there is no possibility of remaining undetected after cheating. The auditing is still required at the end in SH-ANM-E to prevent any collusion between a node and its children. SH-ANM-E requires more network resources because the message size is bigger as compared to SH-ANM. Also more computational resources will be required because of the extra step of verification of LPI. Since there is a trade-off between the cheating detection capability and resource requirements, the administrator of the system has to choose one of them according to the requirements of the content provider.
Properties
In this section we characterize the properties of the protocols proposed in section 3. We first present the definitions of strong-communication compatibility, strong-algorithm compatibility and faithful implementation and then show that the proposed protocols are faithful implementations of the SH mechanism. [14] A distributed mechanism is Strong-Communication Compatible (Strong-CC), if a participating node cannot obtain higher utility by deviating from the suggested message-passing strategy (independent of its informationrevelation and computational actions), when other nodes follow the suggested specification. Definition 4.2 (Strong-Algorithm Compatibility) [14] A distributed mechanism is Strong-Algorithm Compatible (Strong-AC), if a node cannot obtain higher utility by dceviating from the suggested computational strategy (independent of its information-revelation and message-passing actions), when other nodes follow the suggested specification. [14] A distributed mechanism specification is a faithful implementation when the corresponding centralized mechanism is strategyproof and when the specification is Strong-CC and Strong-AC Theorem 4.1 SH-ANM and SH-ANM-E are faithful distributed implementations ofthe SH mechanism.
Proof (sketch) In order to prove this we show that both SH-ANMV and SH-ANM-E satisfy the three properties in Definition 4.3.
(i) The corresponding centralized mechanism is strategyproof: SH-ANM and SH-ANM-E are distributed implementations of the SH mechanism. Since the SH mechanism is group-strategyproof [l1], which is a stronger property than strategy-proofness, it is also strategy-proof.
(i;) Strong-CC: In all the three phases of both S -ANM For our experiments we ran the protocols on the PlanetLab [2] distributed environment. We selected eight PlanetLab nodes and created a multicast tree. The number of users was generated randomly using the discrete uniform distribution over the interval [1 ,5] . The utilities of the users were also generated randomly using the discrete uniform distribution over the interval [1, 100] . We call a complete execution of a mechanism an experiment. Nodes 2, 3 and 4 cheated with a probability Prob, = 0.2. We ran the experiments with different values of the probability of auditing Probe. For each value of Probp, we ran 100 experiments and took the average over those experiments. This was particularly done because PlanetLab is a very dynamic environment and only one experiment would be insufficient to draw conclusions. The main data collected for analysis was the time required for each node to execute the mechanism, the number of rounds required to stabilize, the number of times a node cheated and the number of times the cheating was detected by the root node.
In Figure 4 we observe that the original SH mechanism takes less time as compared to the SR-ANM mechanism. SH-ANM mechanism requires more time because it involves encryption and decryption of the messages sent to all the nodes as well as collecting and checking the proofs at the end. However we note that the increase in the overall execution time is less than 500o in the case of SH-ANM with Probp = 0.2. Thus SH-ANM does not induce a significant overhead. The average time required for SH-ANM is between 4 to 7 seconds which is negligible as compared to the actual multicast transmission (typically an audio or video of average length of several minutes). We also observe that the time required by the nodes to complete the protocol is directly dependent on the probability of auditing (Probp). This is expected because the higher the probability, the higher the time spent in sending and checking the proofs. Figure 5 shows that increasing the auditing probability Probp the protocol is able to detect more cheating. As expected at Probp = 1, the protocol detects all the cheating done by the nodes. The experimental results show that SH-ANM protocol is very effective in detecting the cheating by the nodes and.
it does not induce a significant overhead to the multicast transmission. The SR-ANM-E protocol requires less time for execution on average because cheating (if any) will be detected early by the children reporting it to the root, who stops the protocol. When the nodes do not cheat the exe cution time for S -ANM-E will be higher as compared to ANM-E. They will be presented in an extended version of this paper.
Summary and Future Work
The Tamper-Proof Model (TPM) assumes that the agents participating in the mechanism will not deviate from the distributed implementation. In the Autonomous Nodes Model (ANM), the agents may deviate and thus the existing TPM mechanisms are vulnerable to manipulations. We proposed two distributed SH mechanisms for ANM (SH-ANM and SH-ANM-E). We used digital signatures for authentication of messages and auditing by the root node to penalize the cheating nodes. Thus no node has incentives to cheat. The second protocol SH-ANM-E includes verification done by the children thus detecting the cheating early in the execution and saving time. We proved that both protocols are faithful implementations of the SH mechanism.
We implemented these mechanisms in a real-world environment to analyze the overhead induced by the additional computation and communication resulting from the authentication and auditing procedures. From the experimental results we conclude that SH-ANM protocol does not induce a significant overhead to the multicast transmission.
In the future we plan to study the convergence of the SH mechanism and also develop faithful mechanisms for other distributed computing problems. 
